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As you know, I have recently been appointed Deputy 
Associate Administrator for Industry Affairs of NASA, 
after having spent 30 years ~n the soap business with 
Procter and Gamble. 
Naturally" you must be asking yourself, "what can 
a background of experience in the soap business contribute 
to the Space Program?" I guess the best answer I can 
make is that cleanliness is said to be. next to Godliness; 
and it seemed to me that becoming associated with outer 
space and its vast eternity was a good first step in 
trying to make this transition. 
The phrase "Industry Affairs" means that I am 
responsible for an over-all purview of NASA's relations 
with Industry. At the moment, however, I am focusing 
my attention on three parts of that relationship. 
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First, I am reviewing our Agency's procurement 
policies to be sure that we state these policies and 
communicate them to industry as clearly as possible. 
Second, I am studying our procedures for putting 
those policies into effect, to be sure that we exercise 
all of our capability to, in fact, carry out the 
policies which we enunciate. 
Third, I am working closely with Dr. George L. 
Simpson, Jr., our Assistant Administrator for Technology 
Utilization, to be sure that we have systems to maximize 
the technological spin-off from the government-financed 
research and development effort of our contractors. In 
this connection, I am also serving as Chairman of NASA's 
Industrial Applications Advisory Committee. This 
Committee is composed of the top research managers of 
several of the leading companies in this country. 
I would like to emphasize at the outset NASAls 
confidence in industry and dependence on industry. 
Most of you know that our budget for the current fiscal 
year, approved by Congress last September, is $3.7 
billion, and that the President has submitted a budget 
for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1963 of $5.7 
billion. About 90% of this year's budget is being 
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contracted out to industry. I think this is evidence 
that we have a great deal of respect for industry and 
have confidence in industry's ability -- not only to 
make the hardware which will be required for our 
missions but also to contribute heavily to the 
imaginative engineering and systems planning which 
is essential to make our program succeed. 
This does not mean, of course, that we are 
simply going to negotiate our contracts and then 
relegate our over-all management responsibility for 
the program to our contractors. 
A fact which we must face is that our Federal 
Government is the only entity in this country -- and 
one of the two entities in the World -- which has the 
resources to carry out a broad space program. This 
being true, the Administrator of NASA and his organiza-
tion, cannot escape the full and direct responsibility 
for the conception and successful execution of each 
project in our program. Furthermore, if we are to 
carry out this responsibility, we must have, within 
NASA, not only the managerial, but also the technical 
competence to coordinate the efforts of our contractors. 
To attain and achieve this technical competence, it is 
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essential for us to retain in-house some portion of 
the basic research and design effort on our projects. 
I would like to review our principal procurement 
policies for you. I am sure that many of you have 
heard them before but perhaps coming from industry 
as I do, I will state them in a little different way. 
First, there are the organizational policies 
which we follow in carrying out our procurement 
processes. 
Our principal organizational policy is that our 
procurement processes are truly de-centralized. Our 
program is too large and intricate for its procurement 
functions to be carried out at an acceptable pace on 
a centralized basis. 
Responsibility for coordinating and directing 
the conception of each of our major projects lies in 
our Program Offices in Washington. A project plan and a 
procurement plan are created for each project and are 
personally approved by Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., our 
Associate Administrator. Once the project and its pro-
curement plan have been approved, the responsibility for 
carrying out the procurement is placed in one of our 
nine major Centers. The responsible Center negotiates 
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the centract for the project" administers the contract, 
and signs off for the Agency when the contract is 
concluded. 
There is a minimwn of control or direction from 
Washington in connection with the detailed actions 
on any contract. We set up policy guidelines frem 
Washingten, and we expect the Centers to. stay within 
these guidelines. We, of course" maintain communication 
with the Centers during the progress ef each contract 
to be sure that we and the Centers are interpreting the 
guide:I.ines in the same way. 
For every procurement for Research and Development 
of $1 million or more, a Source Evaluation Board is 
appointed to evaluate all cempanies Who. participate in 
the procurement competition. This Beard reports to the 
Directer of the respensib1e Center, if the precurement 
is for less than $5 mi11ien. It reperts to. the Adminis-
trator ef the Agency en precurements ef mere than 
$5,mi1lien. 
I emphas ize that this is a Source Evaluat ion Board 
and net a Seurce Selection Beard. Depending en the size 
of the precurement" the final respensibility fer the 
selection ef the contractor must rest on the Director 
of the respensible Center, or the Administrator of 
the Agency. 
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We do not ask our Source Evaluation Boards to 
select and recommend the final contractor because we do 
not think that the members of these boards can be in 
a position to take all factors into account. The Center 
Director, or the Administrator, must add to the evaluation 
of the Board, those elements of judgment and knowledge 
which he may have and which the Board may not be in a 
position to have. 
In making his final selection, and adding these 
judgment elements, Mr. James E. Webb, our Administrator, 
consults very, very closely with Dr. Hugh Dryden, our 
Deputy Administrator and Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., 
our Associate Administrator. 
I know that our system of decentralized procurement 
sometimes represents a problem to our contractors, 
particularly the sUb-contractors, who are anxious to 
get some business and who have difficulty in finding 
the locus of the procurement decision before it is too 
late to properly present their case. To those who 
occasionally have this problem, I can only reply that 
we do our best to avoid this, and that they would be 
even more unhappy with a large over-centralized slow-
moving procurement organization. 
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Another key point of organization policy in our 
procurement process is that we have avoided building 
up a large independent contract administration capa-
bility of our own. In the interest of economy, and 
rapidity, and simplicity of action, we have, wherever 
possible, used some element in the Department of 
Defense contract administration organization to do our 
contract administration. At the present time, about 
2,500 people from the Department of Defense are allocated 
to contract administration for us. 
It is our objective in NASA to have one over-
riding objective in all of our procurement policies; 
and that is so to make our contracts that we will 
achieve the highest standards in reliability and systems 
performance. Any procurement policy which interferes 
with, or damages, the reliability of OUI' systems, or 
the performance of our hardware, is a wrong policy 
or, the policy has not been properly applied. 
Coming from industry, I can perhaps speak to the 
point of reliability with more understanding than someone 
who has not been responsible for production processes. 
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I have come to the conclusion that most managers 
in industry, and those responsible to them, including 
foremen and production workers on the line, think that 
their standards of reliability are higher than they are. 
Most of them think that their standards are very little 
short of perfection. 
The fact is, of course, that a very high degree of 
reliability is very expensive; and that the customers 
of most businesses are either unable or unwilling to 
pay for a really high degree of reliability. 
When we, in NASA, ask contractors to achieve a 
high standard of reliability, we-often cannot at 
first convince the contractor that he does not already 
have the standard we seek. Then, when we do convince 
the contractor's management, the management, in turn, 
has a tremendous problem educating his work force to 
adopt and carry out a higher standard. 
Reliability is a state of mind. As you well know, 
when an organization has been trained to one state of 
mind, it does not quickly and readily swing over to 
another attitude or state of mind. 
I think that one of the most important elements 
of technological spin-off that can accrue to American 
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industry from the Space Program is a capability in 
industry to produce a higher degree of reliability 
when it is demanded. 
Aside from organizational policy, the principal 
points of procurement policy which we have uppermost 
in our minds are as follows: 
In the best tradition of American business, we 
naturally think that contractors will put on their best 
performance and that in the long run, both their own 
interests and the Government's interests will best be 
served if we have as much competition as possible among 
"would be" NASA contractors. I suspect that most of 
you would agree with the feeling which I always had 
when I was in industry; namely, that I believe strongly 
in the free enterprise system, and in competition. But 
you couldn't make me say that I enjoyed the competition. 
Wherever possible, we do, of course, obtain 
competition, by advertising formally, using precise 
specifications. As you know, this process is possible 
on only a limited amount of our procurement -- because 
we cannot write precise specifications at the outset 
of most of our projects. 
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On these research and development projects~ 
where we cannot write precise specifications, and 
where consequently prospective contractors cannot 
risk fixed price bids, we try to get competition through 
other processes. We do this by writing as precise a 
definition as we can of the project and issuing requests 
for proposals to interested companies. We try to have 
as many eligible companies as possible compete for a 
negotiated contract. 
If expensive or elaborate design work and calcula-
tions are involved, we only invite companies which we 
believe to be capable of performing under the planned 
contract to submit proposals. However, any other 
company which asks to submit a proposal is permitted 
to do so, and it gets full consideration. 
Too many of our contracts have had to be 
negotiated on a cost plus fixed fee basis because 
of the absolute impossibility of estimating target 
costs at the outset of the project. I am sure that 
we would all like to eliminate the cost plus fixed 
fee type of contract, if we could possibly find a 
way to do so. 
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One way to do so is, of course, to put financial 
incentives into a contract, which are not based on 
a fixed price, but which are built around either cost, 
schedule, or quality targets. Most of us are inclined 
to associate these incentives with cost targets. I 
think we, in NASA, are increasingly inclined to believe 
that schedule or quality targets are of the greatest 
importance. Schedule targets, if sensibly set, and 
achieved, will not only produce the rewards of having 
the project accomplished as planned, but also in most 
cases, inherently reduce costs as well. Target date 
slippage, of course, produces increased costs, because 
overheads continue for an added period of time. 
If we do not recognize this principal, and 
set our incentive targets accordingly, we will 
quickly disinterest those who accept incentive 
contracts in becoming repeaters. 
It is our policy to give small business every 
chance to get a fair share of the procurement in our 
Space Program. Since NASA is placing very few of the 
larger prime contracts which small business has a chance 
to procure, we must make certain that our prime con-
tractors place their sub-contracts, and that their 
sub-contractors place their sub-contracts in a way 
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which treats small business fairly. This means 
that we, in NASA, have an important job to do in 
making certain that our prime contractors understand 
their responsibility in this matter; and that they 
do, in fact, carry out their responsibility. 
On the first of January, 1963, with agreement with 
the Bureau of the Budget, we set up a system under 
which 12 of our prime contractors and their first-tier 
sub-contractors are asked to send us a postcard as they 
place each sub-contract, or order for material. As one 
item on this postcard, they indicate whether or not 
the order has been placed with a small business. 
This mechanism will help to keep us more precisely 
informed as to how small business is faring with NASA. 
It is our policy in NASA to avoid sole-source 
procurement, unless there is a very good reason 
to go sole-source. These good reasons do sometimes 
exist. We also do all we can to avoid competitive 
procurements which are carried out in such a way 
that the winner of the competition, because of an 
established position, becomes a de facto sole source. 
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Finally, we are negotiating into each of our 
major contracts a clause which requires the contrac-
tor and his sub-contractors, not only to report 
patentable innovations to us, but also to report 
non-patentable innovations which flow from the 
expenditure of Government funds. This is going to 
be a difficult clause to administer. However, we 
have considerable evidence that non-patentable 
innovations outnumber patentable innovations by four 
or five to one. We think we have a responsibility to 
make certain that all of industry, whether space-
related or not, has an opportunity to utilize these 
non-patentable innovations when they are developed 
with Government funds. 
The development of this type of innovation is 
not the major reason for our Space Program by any 
means but it is a very important by-product 
which we must be sure is utilized to the fullest. 
I wish that I could tell you that we have 
perfected the administrative machinery for putting 
these policies into effect. We all know that improving 
the administrative mechanism will be a never-ending 
task. I believe, however .. that we are making constant 
and steady progress toward our administrative goals; and 
I hope that this review of our procurement policies has 
helped to give you some better idea of our approach 
to procurement in NASA. 
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